Reason Or Emotionalism: There Is No Middle Ground

A friend recently asked me whether it is possible to be ‘too rational.’ The following is a portion of my response:

Here's my first concern about the question: what could possibly be involved in being too (which I take to mean 'overly') logical? What would that look like? If characteristic 'x' exists in a person to a degree beyond that which is conducive to their happiness, we say that the person is 'too x' (e.g. 'too fat,' 'too aggressive,' or 'too pessimistic'). Happiness is the state of consciousness that arises from the realization of one's values. However, logic is a human being's only means of organizing perceptual data, i.e. our only way of learning about existence. Evidently, then, the pursuit of our own happiness requires learning about all different aspects of the world around us - what are the relevant facts? do these facts tell us anything about how we should act in the future? what does that mean our values should be? how ought we to pursue those values once we've identified them? etc, etc, etc. Consequently, a process of thought (to wit: a chain of reasoning) is a necessary condition for our happiness. And the more efficacious our process of thought, the better able we are to pursue and realize our values!

To put the point differently: the strict application of logic could not possibly endanger our well-being since it exists in a proportional relationship with it. If we think rationally, we can identify the facts of the world, determine our values, pursue those values effectively, and achieve our own good in our own way.

As I suggest above, the question stems from a profound misunderstanding of the role that reason plays in the human cognitive process. It is, indeed, impossible on its face for a human being to be ‘too rational.’

Since I responded to the question nearly a week ago, however, I’ve queried a few acquaintances and have discovered that the mistake is far more common that I had thought. There seems to be a general impression that a bargain can be struck between reason and some other sham faculty of awareness, whether it be intuition, revelation, or a sixth sense.

Dr. Leonard Peikoff formulates the full repercussions of striking such a bargain between reason and emotionalism with characteristic clarity:

If one attempts to combine reason and emotionalism, the principle of reason cannot be his guide, the element that defines the terms of the compromise, because reason does not permit subjective feeling to have any voice in cognitive issues. Subjective feeling, therefore, which permits anyone anything he wants, must set the terms; it must be the element that decides the role and limits of reason. Thus the ruling principle of the epistemological middle-of-the-road’er is: ‘I will consult facts and obey the rules of evidence sometimes – when I feel like it.'

Reason is an absolute. And, when it comes to the pursuit of knowledge, no compromise is possible between rationality and emotionalism.

On Capital Punishment

People are in nearly universal agreement that criminals must be punished - even the most compassionate left-winger will concede that some form of penalty is necessary - but by what standard of justice should that punishment be meted out? When is the death penalty justifiable, if ever?

The Canadian justice system made its feelings known on the matter on July 14th, 1976. Canada formally abolished the death penalty and cited three principal reasons for doing so:

(1) The possibility of wrongful conviction

(2) Questions regarding the state/government's right to take the life of an individual

(3) Uncertainty regarding the deterring effect of capital punishment

It is my opinion that the first point has the most force. I contend that, in a state of nature, any person would be morally justified in executing an individual who they can irrefutably prove has committed murder (provided, of course, that mens rea and actus rea can be shown). If we accept that every individual has a right to their own life, then the willful and malicious taking of a human life seems to demand the forfeiture of the guilty party's own right to the same. Consequently, it seems clear that capital punishment is morally permissible in a state of nature given complete knowledge regarding the event.

Translating this moral permissibility into public policy, however, is complex to say the least. Juries and judges are far from omniscient and if a single innocent life is taken because of capital punishment then a horrendous injustice has occurred and the policy must be judged wholly unacceptable. This concern was obviously paramount in Canada's elimination of the death penalty since the Steven Truscott case is considered to have been a crucial factor in the decision.

There may, however, be a way of constructing a policy to avoid this trouble. I'm not a legal philosopher but, given a situation in which the standard of absolute certainty (reasonable doubt would not be sufficient) are met, I see no reason why this problem should be damning to capital punishment in all cases. The demand for the highest possible standard of proof would make it very rare that the death penalty be applied, but, theoretically, capital punishment could still be a consistent and moral public policy.

The second point does not hold as much force as the first. The government is not some abstracted entity that can boast its own unique moral code. The government is merely a collection of individuals. Agents acting in its name are morally justified in doing only that which an individual is morally justified in doing with the obvious exception of the use of physical coercion in order to administer the law. Since we have established that an individual has the right to implement capital punishment in a state of nature given absolute proof, and given that we surrender the right to actualize that punishment ourselves by entering into society, the government should be perfectly justified in applying capital punishment as a policy.

To address the final point, I would be best served by quoting H.L. Mencken on the subject:

[This argument's] fundamental error consists in assuming that the whole aim of punishing criminals is to deter other (potential) criminals--that we hang or electrocute A simply in order to so alarm B that he will not kill C. This, I believe, is an assumption which confuses a part with the whole. Deterrence, obviously, is one of the aims of punishment, but it is surely not the only one. On the contrary, there are at least half a dozen, and some are probably quite as important. At least one of them, practically considered, is more important. Commonly, it is described as revenge, but revenge is really not the word for it. I borrow a better term from the late Aristotle: katharsis. Katharsis, so used, means a salubrious discharge of emotions, a healthy letting off of steam. A school-boy, disliking his teacher, deposits a tack upon the pedagogical chair; the teacher jumps and the boy laughs. This is katharsis. What I contend is that one of the prime objects of all judicial punishments is to afford the same grateful relief (a) to the immediate victims of the criminal punished, and (b) to the general body of moral and timorous men.

Considering these points, it seems that capital punishment is perfectly acceptable from a moral perspective but that practical and epistemological considerations are potentially a deal-breaker. Governments are theoretically justified in executing criminals who willfully and maliciously commit homicide while in full possession of their faculties but, unless the problem of wrongful executions as raised in the first point can be persuasively addressed, the current policy in Canada is likely the proper one.

UPDATE: I crossposted this article at Dust My Broom and we had an interesting discussion in the comments section. The debate seemed to boil down to whether or not it is justifiable to sacrifice an innocent individual for the collective good of society. My answer was vehemently to the negative while many others supported the maxim "the ends justify the means." Judge for yourselves.